ile the hedge funds industry has grown at a fast pace during the past decade, lack of transparency, need for professionally conducted due diligence, and the inaccessibility to new investors of closed funds led to a significant growth in funds of funds (FOFs). These funds invest in multiple individual hedge funds, hold shares in closed hedge funds, and provide professional oversight on individual hedge funds. The percentage of hedge fund assets that are managed by FOFs increased throughout the past 18 years: Up from 5% in 1990 to 17% m 2000, and 36% in 2006, it stood at 44% of the $1.7 trillion of total hedge fund assets at the end of the second quarter of 2007, according to a report by Hedge Fund J^esearch hic. FOFs are also becoming a major venue for institutional investors, such as pension funds, endowments, and wealthy individuals to access hedge funds. According to data collected in Pensions & Inpestments' first survey of hedge funds of funds, more than half of the assets invested in FOFs are from these institutional investors. The industry is also predicting deeper involvement of FOFs in managing institutional money.
As new FOFs are started every year, several questions require an answer: Is there any difference in risk-adjusted performance between newly started and existing FOFs? Do the risk profiles of FOFs change over time? If so, how is this change related to managerial incentives? This article explores these issues by examining performance, risk-taking behavior, and the underlying managerial incentives of new and seasoned hedge fund managers. Throughout the article, "seasoned" and "existing" will be used interchangeably to refer to funds that are not newly started ones.
Past studies on FOFs mainly explore their performance, risk characteristics, fees structure, diversification benefits, and so on.
Liang 12004] compares FOFs to individual hedge funds and CTAs and recognizes them as different asset classes. Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Kamadorai |2()0H] examine the performance and risk profile, as well as the capital formation of FOFs. Amo, Harasty, and Hillion [2007] discuss the diversification benefits of FOFs. In this article, we compare the performance and risk profile between new and seasoned FOF managers and find collective evidence that younger managers tend to be more cautious in their risk-taking and some weak evidence that younger ones also deliver better abnormal performances.
Professional managers are believed to change in their risk-taking behavior as tliey age. Ellison [1997, 1999| point out that the (possible) early termination of younger (mutual fund) managers leads to their implicit incentives to avoid unsystematic risk. Avery and Chevalier [1999] show that younger managers are more likely to "herd" while senior managers do not to signal their ability. On the other hand, Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey |2()()6] also present empirical evidence that financial managers are usually overconfident.
Boyson |2005] conducts a study on the risk-taking behavior for individual hedge funds and finds that more senior risk-taking managers have a significantly higher probability of failure than junior managers, which supports the hypothesis of less risk-taking senior managers. Our study on the risk-taking behavior of FOFs related to manager tenure, however, shows similar results tor mutual funds studies and contrasting results with Boyson's findings on individual managers.
In this article, standard deviation is used as the measure tor total risk-taking and overall ß exposure is used as the measure for systematic risk. We also use the Horfind.ihl measure to evaluate the concentration level of an FOF with respect to different styles of individual hedge funds. Multitactor models are used to evaluate YOV performance. The factors are chosen to cover a wide range, in correspondence to the wide range of tliiaruial instruments traded by hedge funds.
Major findings are as follows. First, we find weak evidence for risk-adjusted performance differentials. Second, we find that newly started FOFs take less total risk and less systematic risk compared to the existing ones. Calculated based on 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month rolling windows, the volatility of existing FOFs stays above that of newly started FOF managers and the difference persists until after about two to three years of the establishment of a new FOF. The gross leverage measure, approximated by aggregating absolute value of risk exposures (j9), is also consistently higher for existing FOFs than for new FOFs. Third, the Herflndahl measure for existing FOFs is consistently higher than th.1t of new FOFs. showing evidence for higher investment concentration. Fourth, we attribute the risktaking differential to "herding" theory as documented by Ellison [1997. 1999] for mutual funds: newly started FOFs are more cautious in risk-taking and "herd" more than the existing ones. Finally we note that the above differences in risk-taking behavior between newly started and existing FOFs are found to disappear after two to three years.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We use the electronic copy ofthe 2005 fund of funds directory published by Alternative Investment Center.' As claimed by the data vendor, they focus exclusively on proven stn*ainlined procedures for data verification, contirmation, and authentication, and this database is the most complete database specific to global funds of hedge funds and th(ir managers." An advantage of studying FOF returns instead of individual hedge funds comes from reduced back-fill bias, which can be quite serious in hedge fund studies.-* Our data include 1,120 FOFs, with information on the start date, net-ot-all-fees performance dat.i, assets under management (AUM). and other fund characteristics. We take the beginning of each year as the observation point for a rolling window and define newly started FOFs to be those with less than one year's return history. 1 he ones with more than one year's return history at observation point are defined to be existing FOFs. Exhibit I is a graph ofthe number of newly started FOFs every year between before 19K7 and 2005. Exhibit 2 reports summary statistics on number of funds and AUM of our FOF data. We have several observations: the FOF industry has a boom after 1998. Exhibit i lists the abnormal performance of newly started and existing FOF portfolios based on multifactor model (1). On the one hand, the alphas are positive for both newly started and existing managers over the sample years, ranging from 8 to 69 basis points a year. The differen--e in alpha between new and seasoned FOFs is not significant acct)rding to a two-sample r-test"* in most ofthe sample years, and in only three out of the seven sample years do newly started FOFs seem to outperform the existing FOFs. There is also a trend of decreasing alp las after 2000, consistent with the findings of Fung et al. [2008|. On the other hand, the abnormal performance seems to decrease in magnitude after 2002, suggesting intense competition within the industry as well as decreasing economic profit due to that. This might explain why less new capital flows into the FOF industrv after 2002. 
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Thirteen factors are used in the model, covering a wide range of traded instruments. They include four equity factors (Fama-French three factors and Carhart [1997] momentum factor), three hond factors (high-yield, term premium, and convertible factors), five look-hack straddle factors as described in Fuug and Hsieh [2001] (PTFSBD. PTFSFX, PTFSCOM, PTFSIR, and PTFSSTK) and an emerging market factor.^ Summary statistics on these factors are reported in Exhibit 4. We also check the correlation matrix of these factors and do not find high correlation between them.
Our data do not provide direct information on how much experience a fund manager has had ni the FOF industry. This might lead to some potential noises for our comparison between the managers in newly started funds versus existing ones. First, a manager is treated as "new" if she/he is with a newly started FOF, despite his/her previous experience. Second, if a FOF changes manager, we treat the new manager as someone with an existing fund. Both noises are likely to lead to weaker results in our proposed comparison. What i.s more. FOFs are usually organized as limited partnerships and change ot manager (general partner) leads to dissolution of the tund. So the latter noise source is less likely to come into play/'
We define newly started FOF managers in a certain sample year to be those who have been in business for less than 12 months at the observation point. The existing managers are those with more than one year's EXHIBIT 2 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 We measure the total risk ot FOFs using return volatility. We calculate and compare the 12-, 24-, and 36-month return volatility for newly started and existing funds in sample years 1995 to 2001. Interestingly, the return volatility for these two portfolios presents a very similar pattern over the seven sample years, as shown in Exhibit 5, which plots the return volatility over a 36-month window: The newly started FOFs have a low^er return volatility than the more seasoned FOFs in the initial stage. This difference continues for about 2-3 years, when the return volatility for the two gradually converges.
Summary Statistics

Before
With multifactor models, we are able to decompose the return of a fund into return from various risk factors. This is especially true for mutual tunds, as illustrated in Sharpe [1992] . We follow a similar route to extract the factor loadings (ß) for FOFs and sum up their absolute values to reilect the fact that even though hedge tunds may take either direction in a trade. FOFs usually are long in individual hedge funds. Thirteen risk factors are used to capture the broad trading universe for hedge funds, namely four equity factors, three bond factors, tlve straddle factors, and oue emerging market tactor.^ We name the resulting measure "GLM" {gross leverage measure) and treat it as a proxy for leverage usage in FOF portfolios." Christie [2007] uses another measure for FOF leverage by det'ming it to be the ratio between the aggregated levered and unlevered returns. His proxy, similarly, requires a series of assumptions, as leverage of hedge funds and FOFs is not public information and can only be inferred.
(2)
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We see from Exhibit 6 that based on the 13 risk factors, the GLM is slightly over 1 tor existing FOFs in the initial sample years and it decreases over the later years, lu contrast, the new FOF portfolio never had a GLM value more than 1, showing that newly started FOFs employ less leverage than their more experienced counterparties. After 1998, both new and seasoned FOFs have GLMs less than 1, showing that both are more cautious in terms ot using leverage. The fall ot 1998 is known to be the most turbulent period to the hedge funds industry, partly due to the failure of LTCM with extreme leverages. Our findings may be due to voluntary and forced reduction in risk exposures: on one hand, managers are more cautious; on the other hand, big brother's failure in the period may lead to credit rationing for all FOFs and especially newly started FOFs. What is more, newly started FOFs consistently have ;t lower GLM throu^ihout the seven sample years, and a two-sample f-test shows that the difference is significant throughout.
EXHIBIT 5 The 36-Monlh Rolling Window Return Volatility for Newly Started and Existing FOFs
To reconfirm that our estimates of risk exposures are reasonable, we utilize the reported results In Fung .xud Hsieh [2008] ' and find that their magnitude of GLM mi^asures is comparable to ours. This suggests that our finding is not sample-dependent.
It the newly started FOFs have incentives to be more cautious, we expect them to have lower unsystematic risk besides having lower total risk. With evidence that newly started FOFs arc cautious to lever up systematic risk, we continue to examine whether newly started FOFs are better diversified to minimize unsystematic risk.
Herfindahl index, calculated as in Equation (3). is widely used to measure the concentration level of a business organization. Getmansky [2004] uses it to measure concentration level within styles of hedge fund industry.
(3)
7=1
where I* represent the percentages of investment in one asset class by a FOF. The Herfindahl measure (hereafter H-measure) is calculated based on the 13-factor model for both newly started and existing FOFs. if a portfolio concentrates on a few risk factors, we should detect a higher H-measure and vice versa. We find that for six out of seven sample three-year windows, the portfolio of existing FOFs has a higher H-measure, showing a higher concentration level for investment into asset classes. A two-sample r-iest also shows that this difference is statistically significant (p-value < 0.001) in the six sample windows., while the exception is not significant (/»-value = 0.791).
We are very curious about this exception: a coincidence of ttiis finding is that durmg that estimation period, many more new FOFs were started as the industry underwent a boom. Our suspicion is that the large number of newly started FOFs have less new capital to chase on average and this leads to capital rationmg, so that newl)/ started FOFs may not be able to diversify as they wish. More funds chasing limited capital and that it leads to wt akcr alpha durmg the time period is also documented in Fung et al. [2008] .
In summary, newly started FOFs tend to be more diversified with less risk exposures and exhibit lower total risk in tl e initial years than i he existing ones as evidenced by lower GLM, H-nieasure, and return volatility. However, the risk-adjusted performance ofthe two is not so different. Ht-nce, we infer that newly started FOFs should have Ligher systematic risks or they are better at choosing systematic risks that deliver good returns. Fung et al. [2(H)8| divide FOFs into "have alphas*' and "have betas" and fii d the "have alphas" are better at delivering abnormal performance than "have betas," which usually have higher lisk exposures instead of delivering alphas consistently. An interesting study would be to combine Fung et al. [.Î(H)8[ and this article to see whether the younger FOFs tend to belong to "have alpha" groups while the more seasoned FOFs tend to belong to "have beta" groups. 1995-1997 1996-1998 1997-1999 1998-2000 1999-2001 2000-2002 2001-2003 
ROBUSTNESS
For robustness testing, we use a different set of risk factors, the pure strategy indices, to explain FOF returns. Since FOFs invest in individual hedge funds and individual hedge funds belong to various styles based on major financial instruments they use and trading strategies they employ, FOFs can be considered as invested in various hedge fund strategies to achieve diversification. Pure strategy indices are constructed from hedge fund style indices provided by various data vendors.'" We regress the FOFs' return on pure strategy indices to evaluate their exposures to the various strategies, and calculate the GLM and H-measure to compare between newly started and existing FOFs.
We then conduct the same exercises as in the previous section for newly started and existing FOFs. The results are reported in Exhibit 8. The pure strategy indices do a reasonably good Job explaining FOF return variations, with mean-adjusted R-s around 80% in general." The results from using pure strategy indices as risk factors are consistent with our previous findings from the 13 factors. The GLM and H-measure are again found to be higher for existing FOFs, showing higher concentration level on strategy investments and risk exposures. We also notice that the magnitude of GLM measure is higher with this new set of risk factors.
CONCLUSION
This article examines the differences in performance, risk-taking behavior, and underlying managerial incentives between newly started and existing FOFs. We investigate the difference in total risk, as well as level of diversification and risk exposure for FOFs. We find that consistent with Ellison [1997, 1999) , newly started FOFs tend to be more cautious in taking risk and are more diversified with lower risk exposure. Newly started FOFs tend to have lower aggregate risk exposure (lower leverage usage), be more diversified, and have lower total return volatility than their more seasoned counterparties. This is true despite the fact that being more established in the industry with access to more hedge funds that might have closed to new investment, existing FOFs are able to be more fully invested with more diversified portfolios. It is also surprising to find that even though FOFs can have double layers of leverage, this does not seem to be the case judging from the magnitude of GLM. It raises concern that many FOFs are having investors" capital sitting with them idling and cannot find real talents to invest. Fung et al. [2008] also point out a worrying picture: The magnitude of alpha is decreasing in the recent years while more capital is flowing into the industry chasing performance. We ask this question: Are the more seasoned FOF managers more "entrenched"? This is a future research topic well worth pursuing.
ENDNOTES
'This database from Alternative hivestment Center lias since been acquired by Barclays and now is a part of BarclayHedge Datahase.
-See http://www.harclayhedge.com/products/fundof-fund-datafeeder.html.
•*Accordingto Fung and Hsieh [20001, back-fill 1995-1997 1996-1998 1997-1999 1998-2000 1999-2001 2000-2002 2001-2003 
B. H-Measure
Sample
Year 1995-1997 1996-1998 1997-1999 1998-2000 1999-2001 2000-2002 2001-2003 Fung and Hsieh [2001] are taken from Hsieh's website.
''Some FOFs are managed by a fund family and can change managers as a mutual fund does. We conduct a search by visiting the FOF website to check whether the manager remains the same. There are some websites that are not accessible, and some do not provide inforjnatiou on the manager. However, out of the ones that do. [nore than 95% of managers are the same as provided in our data.
The four equity factors are three Fama-French factors and Carhart [1997] momentum factor; the three bond factors are return on long-term, high yield, and convertible bonds; the five straddle factors are return on constructed straddles based on tutures contracts, including currency futures, bond futures, commodity futures, interest rate futures, and stock index futures. The emerging market factor is return on MSCI emerging markets. All returns are in excess of the risk-free rate.
"The adjusted R~ for the regression based on which GLM is calculated shows reasonable explanatory power for FOFs. ranging from 50-80%.
''They run a seven-factor model to capture FOFs' alphas and risk exposures usmg a combined FOF sample from C!SDM, HFR and TASS databases. "Various data vendors provide different index values for similar/same styles since the managers reporting to them are not all the -ame. However, the style indices are highly correlated as they describe similar/same strategies. The pure strategy indices are a weighted average of indices for the same style, and the weight is based on the contribution of an index to th.: first principal component extracted from the style indice* of various sources (data vendors). The data vendors we usr in constructing our pure strategy indices include CiSDM, HFR, and TASS. There are seven pure strategy indices constructed: convertible arbitrage, event driven, equity hedge, merger arbitrage, equity market neutral, global macro, and managed futures. These seven pure strategy indices serve as risk factors m Regression (1). More detailed discussion on pure strategy indices can be found in Lhabitant [2004] .
"These are pseudo-R's since we impose the positive coefficients constraint to reflect the fact that FOFs can only be considered long certain hedge funds strategies and that an R-from a constrained regression is not the same as what we usually mean by R-. However, high pseudo-R-still reflects better explanatory power of the model.
